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Mashanga. Swann appears to have believed Mpezeni sincerely wished to stop raiding into the Protectorate although his people continued to do so.[88]

The cleavage within the tribe between Chief and people was attributed by Wiese to the large number of captives who had been incorporated.[89] We may well ask whether there had not always been considerable fluidity in the distribution of power among the different branches of the royal house and their supporters. After the death of Zwangendaba there was factional fighting, and at least once on the march north, about 1840, there was a purge in which the original members of the tribe, presumably Ndandwe by origin, killed off many of the more recently incorporated Tsonga who had been promoted at their expense.[90] These struggles show clearly that the formal arrangement of segments within the residential system did not preclude struggles for power within that system. The decline in power of Mpezeni and the rise of his heir must indeed be seen as part of the normal operation of the system rather than the result of manipulation or of unusual external conditions.

Wiese anticipated that there would be fighting on the death of Mpezeni.[91] Some idea of the way in which the fight would have gone in the new circumstances of European contact is given by Wiese's statement, in 1891, that Nzermane would not submit to Nsingu on Mpezeni's death and that he would be the best successor as far as the interests of Portugal were concerned.[92] Later, Deare remarked that the 'king had two other sons, younger than Tsinko, named Zamane and Madzimai, whom I never saw, but I learnt much about them and had fixed my eye on the former for the succession if anything happened'.[93] When British troops had already begun their advance on Ngoni, Manning, their commander, hoped that the tribe would split into factions, some of which would side with him.[94]

Fighting between rival claimants for the throne was likely even without external backing for one candidate. We have only to turn to Zululand for an analogous situation in which there was fighting

[88] Swann's report for 1896, *B.C.A.G.*, iv, 7 (15 April 1897), p. 1.
[89] Wiese, 'Geschichte', p. 187.
[90] See p. 19. Elmslie, *Wild Ngoni*, p. 24; Chibambo, *My Ngoni*, p. 23; cf. Young, *History*, p. 112, who reverses the role played by witch-finders in this incident.
[91] As reported by Warton in June 1896, cited by Poole, *Native tribes*, p. 13.
[92] Wiese, 'Expedição', p. 493.
[93] Deare, 'Slave raiders', 11 May. In modern spelling, Nsingu, Nzermane, and Madzimawi.
[94] 181, fo. 99.

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man presenting his request for a gun licence, or for permission to go to Southern Rhodesia, or to move to another village, or whatever it may be, is told first to bring a letter from his chief in support of his request and it will then be considered. Thus the approval of the chief is necessary for a variety of enterprises.

A chief may decide not to support a request for a variety of reasons. He does not want to recommend to the Administration projects which will turn out unfavourably, and yet he does not want to oppose unnecessarily the wishes of his people who may begin to drift away into other counties or to Southern Rhodesia if they feel he is being unfair to them. Many of these requests from his people are handled by the court clerk who has custody of the rubber stamps, without whose imprint no letter looks official. Other councillors and advisers may also help with these requests, and may advise the chief, in the light of their own interests and of their estimate of the public interests, on whether or not to support a request. There is thus opportunity for a friend of the chief to block rivals and enemies by seeing that their requests do not go forward. Men who are thwarted in this way can appeal to the Administration, and may perhaps be granted their request. Such action, however, is likely to increase the antagonism of the Native Authority towards them, and in so far as they have defied the authority of the chief by appealing against his decision, they may be censured by their neighbours. Thus what they gain in one respect may be offset by what they lose in another. When the quarrel between a councillor and a man who is, say, trying to open a shop in his village is of long standing and with faults and undisclosed offences on both sides, it may be unwise to risk the whole matter being brought to the notice of the Administration by an appeal over the matter of the shop.

In other situations, where the Administration endeavours to intervene in some matter in which the chief is thought to be dilatory, the Native Authority may shield a man because of the danger of possible repercussions. Thus, for instance, a District Officer on tour found a man living in a village at which he was not registered. He turned the offender over to the Native Court. The offender had a perfectly good defence but his story would have involved reference to incest by an important person and it was therefore undesirable that the District Officer should hear of the matter. Accordingly the Court delayed the hearing of the case on some technicality, and after the District Officer had left the area nothing more was done.

In the main the Administration presents a united front to the Ngoni, and the words and actions of each Administrative officer

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648 support those of his colleagues. However, chiefs and others do
[661] sometimes manage to play off one administrator against another where there are differences of interest between different departments of the Administration, and occasionally appeals by Ngoni chiefs to high Administrative officials against the actions of their juniors are successful. It is easier for Ngoni to exploit the much greater differences of interest between the different sections of the non-African community, officials, missions, planters and European and Indian traders.

648 In the early years of this century it appears that the chiefs were
●662 approached by labour recruiters, planters, and missionaries who wished to gain their favour and utilize this to their own advantage. It is difficult to gauge to what extent this practice continues. There are one or two recent instances where the missions have clearly
[797] recognized the importance to them of securing the goodwill of an Ngoni in high authority, and it would also appear that some high-placed Ngoni have utilized their position to gain from the missions services which might not otherwise have been so readily available to them. With the cessation of labour recruiting there has been no
[464] opportunity for recruiters to offer presents to chiefs to sweeten their way. The nearest modern equivalent to this practice is found in the
[466] facilities sometimes provided by mine managers in the Copperbelt
[574] and elsewhere for Ngoni and other chiefs to visit their tribesmen working there, but with the increased stabilization of labour at the mines this arrangement has declined in importance. Traders have been known to offer bribes to chiefs, but so far as can be judged, money and goods handed over in this way often bring no return, and indeed some of the objects for which bribes are offered are plainly beyond the power of the person concerned to grant. Planters also seek to gain the support of those with influence in tribal and village life. In matters of this kind it is difficult for the observer who spends only a short time in the area to come to any quantitative estimates, but it is my impression that as compared with comparable situations in West Africa, as reported in the literature, there is little bribery in Ngoni society. The first reason that suggests itself is the poverty of the Ngoni in relation to their European and Indian neighbours. Ngoni do not control any rich natural resources,
[556] save perhaps for a few timber trees, with which they might be persuaded to part. The only form of wealth they possess which is of value to their neighbours is their manpower. This was once worth buying and perhaps could be bought. Now the chiefs and headmen do not have the authority to order their people to go and
[461] work for a particular employer. Even if they did, Ngoni make

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inefficient workers on the local tobacco farms, where the ties that link them to the near-by villages with their marriages, funerals, and beer parties are still operative, and where the wages are much lower than in Southern Rhodesia. Secondly, Ngoni tend to suspect the good intentions of any non-African, however lavish he may be with his presents, and for this reason are reluctant to enter into agreements with them the social consequences of which they cannot foresee.

2. *Rivals of the Paramount Chief*

In pre-conquest times the death of the head of the State was followed by a struggle between rival heirs and by fission of the State. Under British colonial rule these struggles cannot be carried on by force of arms, and it is difficult to split the tribe when there is nowhere for the dissident section to move to and when Administrative recognition is an important condition for political existence. Nevertheless the same struggles continue even if in a different guise.

One of the most interesting incidents in the struggles between rival groups for the chieftainship occurred in 1903 and hinged on an aspect of segmentation within the residential system which we have not so far discussed. It was customary for the heir to a large segment founded by his father to place one wife in the headquarters of that segment as well as establishing his bevies of wives with their own inferior segments. The eldest son of the selected wife grew up to be in charge of the headquarters and came to be identified with his father's father, the founder of the headquarters, as against his father who was lord of its segment. Thus, for example, Zwangendaba, heir to segment 1, founded segment 18 for his own great wife, but also placed one of his wives in the headquarters of segment 1, the segment founded by his father for *his* great wife. Similarly Mpezeni, as son of Zwangendaba, placed one of his wives in the headquarters of segment 4, which by then had replaced the annihilated segment 18. In this matter the Ngoni seem to have differed from the Zulu, for among them, according to Bryant, the *isizinda*, son of the placed wife, represents his own father as against the father's main heir.[1]

In 1903 the eldest son of Mpezeni I by the selected wife in segment 4 tried to assume the name of his father's father, Zwangendaba. This was in accord with his structural position as representing the interests of the founder of the segment as against those of the

[1] Lancaster, 'Chronology', p. 80; Bryant, *Dictionary*, s.v. *isi-zinda*. cf. Hunter, *Reaction to Conquest*, p. 401. Lancaster implies that the selected wife was called *ihlolwa*. This seems unlikely in view of the Zulu use of *i(li)hlolwa* for the senior left-hand wife.

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and is not to be treated as if he were the mere husband of a kinswoman. Indeed, all marital affairs of chiefs tend to have political significance; they are much discussed in the tribe and are the particular concern of senior lieutenants of counties. A recent incident illustrates how in relations with his affines a chief is bound by the instructions of his political advisers. A chief hit his wife while drinking beer in her brother's house. Her father reprimanded him. At a meeting held to discuss the quarrel, the county lieutenants and a kinsman of the chief, his father's deputy, ordered the woman's father to pay two beasts to the chief. The chief himself said nothing. A week or so later the man offered the beasts to the chief who said he did not want them. Just over a year later the chief's kinsman complained to the chief that the beast[12] had not been paid. The chief replied that he did not want the cattle and that at the meeting he had wanted his wife's father to be merely cautioned. His kinsman said that despite this he would call the lieutenants who had taken the original decision and get them to ask the woman's father why he had not paid. Hearing this, the man offered a beast which was accepted.[13]

Thus it is the chief in his position as head of a major segment and a county who is honoured with beer and whose marriages are protected, and not the chief as a bibulous aristocrat. The chief himself does not drink all, or even any, of the beer presented to him but he is responsible for dispensing it. A chief who acts like a commoner and wanders through his villages seeking beer risks the reprimands of his lieutenants, for it is difficult to refuse a chief beer under those conditions. A chief should not visit his people's villages unless they invite him, or unless he has at least warned them of his intention.

The gifts received by a chief from returned labour migrants are sometimes cited as a modern form of tribute, but while these presents may be more expensive in pecuniary terms than beer, they do not have the same great social importance. The shirt or hat presented by a man recently back from Southern Rhodesia may bring him favourable attention from the chief, but the present is made by an individual and arises from his own political aspirations. So far as I could tell, such presents are not effective as bribes. On the other hand, the presentation of beer is an affirmation of a reationship between a social group, often a village or division, and a political office, and most of those affected directly

[12] At the meeting two beasts were asked for, but a year later only one beast was mentioned.

[13] cf. Barnes, *Marriage*, for the political significance of affinal ties.

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these need the support and co-operation of the African community. The Administration has consulted Ngoni and other Native Authorities on such matters as agricultural control, the emigration of women to the railway line, provision of better schools, and so on. In 1948 the number of councillor posts was reduced. Instead of employing councillors for general duties, each of the four councillors remaining, now receiving a much higher salary than before, has been given a specific task, the care of roads, the promotion of agriculture, the efficient use of school facilities, and the co-ordination of the work of the Native Authority as a whole. The Administration has attempted to make these four councillors, together with the ten Northern Rhodesian chiefs, into a formal council competent to take decisions without always referring to the people as a whole.

So far this attempt has not been very successful, but the power of the four councillors is certainly greater than that of their more numerous and lower-paid predecessors. The court clerks have been overshadowed by these new men and left behind in these new activities. Literacy is becoming common and clerks are no longer in demand as secretaries to chiefs. The Native Authority is beginning to employ men whose jobs do not take them to court at all.

The present range of posts whose emoluments are handled by the Native Treasury is shown in Table VIII.[1]

All these posts are filled by the Native Authority in agreement with the Administration. It is easy to show how a large proportion of the employees are connected to the chiefs and senior lieutenants by kinship, but this fact is not as significant as it might appear. The Ngoni possess nowadays what may be called an omni-directional kinship system in which ties of kinship can be traced as convenient through fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, husbands and wives, and by any combination of these. It would indeed be surprising if Native Authority employees could not trace genealogical connexion with chiefs and their lieutenants, for so can nearly everyone in Ngoniland. There is no formal selection procedure but a chief may announce at a county meeting that there is a post to be filled and those present may suggest names. Alternatively a chief may discuss the matter with his advisers and then offer the post to the man they decide on. Occasionally a man seeking employment approaches the Paramount Chief in the hope that there may be a post to be filled. Thus although those who live near the chief, or who make it their business to see him and drink with him frequently stand a greater change of being chosen, choice is not restricted to these people.

[1] [see page 152, category 116. —Analyst]

[Text continues on page 153]

2: Read E-5 (1935-1939) 1956
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from the campaign and the purification of those who had killed any of the enemy.

Cibambo and other Ngoni informants had no idea of the size of the Ngoni armies beyond emphasizing that they were 'very big and very strong'. Evidence was forthcoming, however, from early European sources on the size of the armies which, though it can only have been based on guess-work, nevertheless gave an indication of the numbers involved. Dr. Elmslie referred in 1878 to having seen in the previous year an army of 10,000 of the northern Ngoni which went out in June and returned in September.[1] In the *B.C.A. Gazette* of December 1894, reference was made to the armies of the central Ngoni which were said to be, at the time of their last raids, 50,000 strong. In the *Blantyre District Note Book* there was an entry of 1884, giving no numbers for the army but reporting on the raid on Blantyre in that year when the 'vanguard of the army was composed entirely of young men in their first vigour of manhood, who were said to have marched 50 miles in half a day'. From such scanty references by Europeans, it is clear that the Ngoni armies in the field consisted of large numbers, were highly organized, and trained to feats of endurance as well as in fighting skill. The Blantyre reference also brought out the authority of the big war *induna*, who was presented with cloth by the Moir brothers of the African Lakes Corporation as a bribe not to attack the Blantyre area again, and kept his promise.

Objectives in warfare

Dr. Kuper wrote of the Swazi military kingdom that wars were waged 'to extend the boundaries, to retain tribal independence and to secure internal solidarity'.[2] After the Ngoni kingdoms were set up in Nyasaland, warfare had the same objectives with the additional one of bringing back captives and cattle. In north Nyasaland Dr. Elmslie, in the reference already cited, wrote that, after the four months' campaigning the Ngoni armies returned 'laden with spoil in slaves, cattle and ivory'. Up to the coming of the Europeans many of the raids and wars took place in the hope of annexing additional territory. Dr. Elmslie wrote in 1878 of the Ngoni dominating an area of 30,000 square miles in north Nyasaland from the lake-shore to the Luangwa river. In central Nyasaland the *B.C.A. Gazette* of 1894 reported that the Ngoni Paramount ruled from the Lintippe river near Lilongwe to the Luvubwe river south of the Kirk Range. The chief challenge to Ngoni security in the northern kingdom came from the Bemba, and in the central kingdom from a combination of Yao and Arabs. Dr. Laws recorded in 1886 that the Ngoni, in their final victorious campaign against the Bemba, had

[1] Elmslie, W. A. *Among the Wild Ngoni*. Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, 1899, p. 79.
[2] Kuper, H. 'The Development of the Military Organisation in Swaziland.' *Africa*, Vol. X, No. 2, p. 176.